| Free will |
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Written by my
alter ego, Thomas Jeffreys Professor
Filice believes that the existence of free will
cannot yet be excluded (‘Free
Will Is Still Alive’, Issue 124). He uses
a series of analogies to encourage us to think
that all is not lost because the complexity of
any neurological explanation must, in his view,
leave space for there being some other way of
explaining how I am doing the choosing. Nowhere,
however, does he actually describe in what
manner our decisions may be made if not randomly
or as a result of a deterministic process.
Towards the end of his article he argues: “What
if… non-chosen motives are many and suitably
complex; and what if they generate routine
indecisions?… the accumulation of
split-decisions over time might prompt me to
develop one side of myself more than another,
and unpredictably.” But no justification is
given for the sudden appearance of this
unpredictability nor how it may differ from
randomness.
Earlier in the article Professor Filice says: “Micro-level changes do, of course, affect the higher levels. Specifically, neurons do affect person-level thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. But the reverse also seems incontrovertible to me.” Well, it is to me as well, because, as we know, the brain is plastic in its functioning and able to adapt to new information supplied to it. We spend all our lives supplying this and our characters, and therefore our motivations, change in consequence. I’m certainly not the person I was, but this is hardly an argument for free will. Indeed all that Professor Filice’s article succeeds in doing is to describe a very complex being, complete with feedback pathways. He then, however, infers without any evidence that its complexity must somehow hide an alternative to determinism or randomness; an alternative which he signally fails to characterize or explain. Thomas Jeffreys, Warwickshire Original version: Sir, Professor
Filice (‘Free Will is still alive’ – Issue 124)
believes that the existence of free will cannot
be excluded. Nowhere, however, does he actually
describe how our decisions may be made, if not
randomly or as a result of a deterministic
process. He uses a series of analogies to
encourage us to think that all is not lost
because the complexity of any physicalist
explanation may, in his view, leave space for
their being some other (undescribed) way of
explaining how “I” am doing the choosing.
Thomas
Jeffreys, WarwickshireTowards the end of his article he refers to a Nietzsche/Strawson argument: “...there is no meaningful form of ultimate self-making or self-programming, because one always needs pre-existing motives to shape your choices. In other words, you might be able to choose how you respond to your desires, but you do not choose the values by which you make this choice… One needs a prior program even in order for one to meaningfully re-program oneself, so no genuine autonomy is possible (even in degree).”. Professor Filice criticizes this argument thus: “What if such non-chosen motives are many and suitably complex; and what if they generate routine indecisions? These indecisions could generate the pause, the space, for self-reflection. A complex psychology might produce a self-initiated (partial) reprogramming. If I am naturally both self-centred and empathetic, both curious and cautious, the accumulation of split-decisions over time might prompt me to develop one side of myself more than another, and unpredictably.”. No justification is given for the sudden appearance of this unpredictability or how it may differ from randomness. Earlier in the article he says: “Micro-level changes do, of course, affect the higher levels. Specifically, neurons do affect person-level thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. But the reverse also seems incontrovertible to me...”. Well it is to me as well, because, as we well know, the brain is plastic in its functioning and well able to adapt to new information supplied to it, something vital for our survival. We spend all our lives doing this and our characters, and therefore our motivations, change in consequence. I’m certainly not the person I was. But this is hardly anything novel or an argument for free will or a demolition of Strawson’s argument. Indeed all that Professor Filice’s article succeeds in doing is to describe a very complex being, complete with feedback pathways. He then, however, infers without any evidence that its complexity must somehow hide an alternative to determinism and randomness, an alternative which he signally fails to characterize or explain in any coherent way.
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